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Affective Consciousness in La Nausée
Abstract
La Nausée, a key to Sartre's work, centers on an affective comprehension of the world, which becomes
cognitive in the author's philosophy. Nausea is the affective equivalent of Descartes's systematic doubt
and of Husserl's reduction. The recent publication of Sartre's earliest writings permits us to isolate his
fundamental concerns, later to be developed in the novel: contingency and its evasion in bad faith. A
certain Antoine Roquentin is shaken by the fear of becoming submerged in Bouville, physically and
socially. He passes through an acute crisis, recorded blow by blow in his diary. It leads to a radical change
of his fundamental project. Roquentin comes to realize that he cannot attain being as a historian. Nor can
he make of his life an art, as his friend Anny had tried to do so unsuccessfully. The imaginary, however,
can be a vehicle to a heightened awareness of reality. Thus a rag-time tune, authentic in its expression of
forlornness, becomes a leitmotif of commitment. Roquentin's failure to intervene forcefully to save
Lucienne and to protect the Autodidacte weighs on him. He determines to seek in literary commitment an
antidote for himself and for others against the all-pervasive spirit of seriousness of the dominant
ideology.
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Suhl: Affective Consciousness in La Nausée

AFFECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS IN LA NAUSEE*
BENJAMIN SUHL
Fairleigh Dickinson University, Teaneck

There was one aspect, among others, of Professor Bede's
Saturday morning lectures at Columbia which every week renewed
our expectation: his unfolding of the historical, social and
philosophical background of nineteenth-century French literature.
In this, like his classmates Sartre and Nizan, in the tradition of
the Ecole Normale Superieure, Bede was not confining himself to
a narrow concept of the literary endeavor.
Because of this broad approach, Bede was able to recognize
very early in Sartre's development that his writing, both literary
and philosophical, would grow into an «edifice ».(1) Indeed,
Sartre has become what he had chosen to be. In the terms of
Herbert Marcuse, he has become, against his will, an institution ... of radical contradiction », (2) that is, of authenticity,. La
Nous& has remained the decisive moment in Sartre's evolution.
And it is possible today, in the light of his now available adolescent
writings and his recent critical-anthropological works and autobiography, to gain a new perspective on this key «diary.»
As its title indicates(3) it is not so much an account of an intellectual comprehension but of a pre-conceptual feeling that
precipitates Antoine Roquentin's acute crisis lasting some five
weeks and more. He can no longer conceive of just anything
as he used to do. Nausea has set a gulf between himself and
things, and between himself and the others, and most disturbing,
is undermining the image he has of himself. Nausea has thus
the same effect as Descartes' systematic doubt and as Husserl's
reduction, inasmuch as Roquentin lives through a suspension of
judgment and inasmuch as it leads him to a radically new frame of
reference. The originality of Sartre's break with tradition lies
in the primacy given to experience in the lived world.(4) «There
is only intuitive knowledge. Deductive and (logical) discourse,
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improperly called knowledge, are only instruments leading to
intuition. 0(5)
Nausea is nausea of something,(6) just as in Sartre's later
writings anxiety (Kierkegaard's fear without object) and vertigo
reveal to us our freedom, the gaze in shame or pride reveals the
other, and praxis reveals the inert around us. Knowledge
is reflection on the lived world. The progression of Roquentin
in La Naas& is just such a rendering conscious of an obscure preknowledge.
One can now easily follow Sartre's evolution preceding the
writing of the novel, thanks to Les Ecrits de Sartre, (7) an unusual
annotated bibliography which contains his early and other little
known writings. Two short pieces, a short story and the fragment
of a novel (of 1923), express an overriding disgust with people who
live in bad faith, which he will later call the spirit of seriousness .(8)
In letters of 1925 appears the first mention of contingency and of
consciousness as a nothingness in being. The Legende de la
verite (1929) represents an attempt to find a form that is both
literary and philosophical in a kind of anthropological conte. Also
two monographs on the levels of consciousness were written by
1936, when Melancholia was completed after five years of work on
this «factum on contingency.* Contingency and the spirit of
seriousness--his earliest writings thus manifest the two concerns
which will reappear in La Nausee.
The originality of Sartre's novel lies, first of all, in the fact
that he can ground the spirit of seriousness in an ontology.(9)
Furthermore, the author brackets out conventional perception with
its time-honored concepts. His protagonist reaches cognitive
consciousness only after a series of elemental experiences which
he registers in what one should call e affective consciousness.*
Roquentin's very perception of things is radically affected.
Things begin to assert themselves and begin to exist in his
hands by nausea. The first sign of a crisis occurred when he held
up a pebble and felt sudden disgust because it was wet and muddy
on one side.(10) Another time he finds himself unable to pick
up, as he was wont to, a muddy bit of paper from the ground. In
a Bachelardian psychoanalysis of things(11) one would say that
these «disgusting» things express his fear of entrapment.
Throughout the book references to the muddy, the oozing, the
viscous and the flabby abound, and «Bouville,* altogether,
becomes a place of both ontological and social entrapment. Firm
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol3/iss1/8
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objects (his pipe, the door-knob) do not inspire the same aversion
in him, but they too will eventually overwhelm him by their
sheer presence. Consciousness, the for-itself, fears the thing,
the in-itself, either because the thing may engulf the mind, or
through its massive inertness lead it to entrapment.
In a mirror Roquentin looks at his face for a long time, unable
to make any sense of this thing, as he can do of those of others.
In Sartre's ontology, to others he is an essence--a redhead, a
historian, a loner. But he cannot in good faith classify himself
since his consciousness is elusive, forever at a distance from his
being, and since he feels by this very fact forever free to change
his course, erasing his former essence. Later on Roquentin
recognizes this dichotomy of consciousness and body: «I feel my
hand. I am these two beasts struggling at the end of my arms ...
It becomes intolerable.» His own hand has suddenly appeared to
him as an alien object: though he plunges a penknife into it and
the blood which escapes ceases to be him, he cannot rid himself of
the body's thingness. «The body lives by itself once it has
begun. But thought--I am the one who continues it, unrolls it"
(N, p. 99). His consciousness (the for-itself) cannot but «exist»
his body (the in-itself), while being at a distance from it.
Roquentin is overwhelmed by this dichotomy when learning of
the death of little Lucienne, her body still exists ... She no longer
exists» (N, p. 100), and breaks into a stream-of-consciousness
monologue in which he abruptly begins to refer to himself in both
the first and third person simultaneously.(12)
His perception of others, and of things related to them, is
equally upset. Even in a cafe, formerly a refuge against his
solitude, he feels nausea (N, pp. 18-23). He perceives «a reddish
flash covered with hair, » conceptualized with effort as a hand
which puts a card on the table; there are other arms moving about.
The cafe owner's cousin, Adolphe, has suspenders whose color
oscillates between violet and blue, appearing to be a vapid mauve,
vapid as he himself is. His glass of beer is yellow, amorphous,
disgusting. Roquentin's deepening distraction eventually leads
to a total bracketing out of human significance in the perception of
things. During a bus ride, for instance, he can no longer call a
bench a bench--it appears to him as the belly of a donkey. The
appelation refuses to adhere to the thing, a de-nomination takes
place.
Eventually an unexpected emotional awareness surges up
Published by New Prairie Press

3

Studies in 20th & 21st Century Literature, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 8
100

STCL, Vol. 3, No. I (Fall 1978)

in Roquentin; it takes place during the well-known encounter with
the chestnut tree (N, pp. 126-35). «1 did not simply see this black:
sight is an abstract invention, a simplified idea, one of man's

ideas. That black, amorphous presence, far surpassed sight,
smell and taste.» It is an affective consciousness leading to an
«absolute,» unrelated to human significance: «Contingency ...
that is the absolute.» And he is overwhelmed by facticity, the
proliferation of things, utterly «too much» precisely because they
are without any reason for existence. Why, then, do they
exist?(13) But exist they do; their raw facticity imposes itself
on all sides.
Upon looking back on the scene of this horrible ecstasy in the
Public Gardens Roquentin recalls: «the garden smiled at me. »
This should probably be taken as a sign of understanding projected
by Roquentin on things which have explained his malaise to him
and revealed, he says, all he will ever get to know about existence.
He has met the «irreducible,» the self-evidence of contingency
and facticity.
Roquentin had had frightening visions a la Bosch also of
Bouville (N, pp. 124-26) and they will recur (N, pp. 158-60).
Since there is facticity without necessity, everything could be other
than it is, and anything could happen. Hence his distress over
the unaccountable failure of M. Fasquelle, the café owner, to
appear behind his counter (N, pp. 6, 70-78, 81). Hence also
Roquentin's dizzying realization during lunch with the Autodidacte of the freedom of his actions--«They aren't completely
wrong to be afraid: I feel as though I could do anything» (N,
p. 123).

However, through the awareness that has welled up in him he
can begin to free himself from the entrapment into the in-itself of
things and into the «inert,»(14) the conventional thoughts and
attitudes of people around him, which has been frightening him
from the start. From this point on in the book, one can notice
a certain hardening of outlines, at least in his relations with
people--the normal tenor of his conversation with Anny, the
change of comportment towards the Autodidacte--and in his final
break with Bouville.
Even before Roquentin's fundamental insight into the
meaning of his nausea, he had felt strong revulsion against
people who, in their bad faith, insist upon having a reason for
being: against himself as the biographer of Rollebon, against
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol3/iss1/8
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the «notables» of Bouville, against the Autodidacte, among many
others.
Research on M. de Rollebon had led Roquentin to Bouville's
library three years earlier. The information he gathers on this
diplomatic adventurer is contradictory. There can be no human
«science.» Roquentin comes to realize that he has lent his life
to Rollebon as a justification for his own existence and he
abandons his project (N, pp. 12-18, 94-98). «What am I going to
do with my life?»(15)
Sunday, after mass, Roquentin watches the recognition
ceremony carried out on the rue Tournebride by the high society,
and especially by the nouveaux riches (N, pp. 40-46). This social
satire of the officials is deepened during a visit to the portrait
gallery of the Bouville Museum (N, pp. 82-94). These commissioned portraits display the image the Bouville elite has of itself.
They are leaders, never troubled by the least doubt; they have
«made» Bouville; they never died intestate or without the last
sacraments. Looking down sternly at him from the wall, one of
these pillars of society makes Roquentin aware that he, Roquentin,
has no right to exist. What had started out as a bit of curiosity
about a seemingly technical problem of proportions in a painting
is quickly becoming a profound revelation for Roquentin. Social
success in business and politics (a sign of predestination, as it
were) has come to represent for such men and those who admire
them a justification for existence. The spirit of seriousness
is thus finally recognized as an evasion of contingency. But as
Roquentin looks fixedly at one of the portraits, whose stare is
particularly «sparkling with righteousness," its assurance
vanishes under Roquentin's gaze. Their strength is thus all
pretense: hollow bad faith. «Farewell beautiful lilies, our pride
and reason for existing, good-bye you bastards! »(16)
In another series of episodes, Sartre has the Autodidacte,
in a parody of learning for learning's sake, pursue his quest for
knowledge by reading books in the Bouville library in alphabetical
order. Roquentin accepts reluctantly, in a show of sympathy,
an invitation to lunch with him (N, pp. 103-23). The Autodidacte
plies his quest with food and questions and forces Roquentin,
embarrassed and finally angered by the earnest commonplaces
uttered, to formulate his answers to this would-be humanist. The
Autodidacte is full of good will towards the everyday people in the
restaurant. But Roquentin points out how they are all playing
Published by New Prairie Press
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roles, all feeling themselves indispensable. Roquentin strips all
of their pretense, including the Autodidacte himself with the unintegrated knowledge(17) that goes to make up his sottisier, his
collection of foolish sayings. Roquentin, in a mood of defiance
denies being a humanist, but he refrains, as he puts it, from
stupidly considering himself «anti -humanist.» Roquentin scores
his abstract humanism as a cloak for loneliness, and as such an
attitude in bad faith Altogether, humanism with its Enlightenment
idea of progress, of the perfectibility of man, and its reliance on
science, has become problematical: «What is the matter with
your science? What have you done with your humanism?
Where is your dignity?. (N, p. 160).
For the first time, in the scene of the lunch with the Autodidacte, one of Roquentin's nauseas is clearly set off by a person
rather than a thing and it is one of his worst (N, pp. 123-26).
This is the crucial juncture by Sartre of the two themes of
contingency and its reverse corollary, the spirit of seriousness.
The hollowness of his companion's words suddenly gives him the
key to his previous nauseas: he recognizes them as the evidence
of existence which is inherently superfluous. Nausea as a way to
«exist our contingency. (EN, p. 404), at first an affective
awareness of facticity and contingency, now has become a
revulsion against people who hide their contingency from themselves through actions in bad faith.
In this diary, grim even when ironic, there is, however, one
kind of event which throughout its course returns Roquentin to
«sanity,» people to their «right» places, which makes Adolphe's
head, for instance, «evident,» his suspenders blue, the beer
«dense» and «indispensable,. cardplay «meaningful.. Roquentin undergoes this bracing experience when he hears an old ragtime tune, Some of these days/You'll miss me honey. (N, pp.
20-23, 173-78). In the rigorous progression of the notes he
finds form that is essence. The necessity of being, and the
coherence of consciousness and being (Sartre's in-itself-for-itself,
the ultimate and unattainable aim of man) which Roquentin has
failed to see in life, now appears in imagination. The work of
art has an order that is outside of human temporality, which so
preoccupies Roquentin, where existence is in the present and
constitutes its essence in the past. «There is another happiness:
outside there is this band of steel, the narrow duration of the music
which traverses our time through and through, rejecting it, tearing
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol3/iss1/8
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at it with its dry little points; there is another time (N, p. 21).
The one person to whom Roquentin had been very much
attached, Anny, an actress, had been trying for many years to
make, if not of her life, at least of some privileged situations in
her life, perfect moments, like works of art. But only in imagination, such as in a musical progression, can we find a realization of
this profound aspiration, as we have just noted. Anny, now
meeting Roquentin again (N, pp. 172-96) after a separation of
four (N, p. 174) or of five (N, p. 81) years, has to admit her utter
failure in having ever succeeded in her play-acting just as
Roquentin now knows that adventures that would be dense and
necessary, which he was seeking all along, exist only in stories
and books, all imaginary. Anny has given up acting altogether,
she now travels, «there is a man who is keeping me ... I outlive
myself.» By a different road she has reached the same conclusion
as Roquentin. Both Anny, who had asked for the meeting, and
Roquentin, who had come with such expectation, now abandon the
last shred of hope each still represented for the other. «I have
the terrible feeling that we have nothing any more to say to one
another.» He looks at an old woman's face, absolutely frightful.» When he sees her leaving Paris by train while imagining
the restaurant to which they used to go in London, «everything
went blank.»
The final episode, after Roquentin has returned to Bouville
to wind up his affairs, concerns the Autodidacte once again.
Roquentin has failed to rescue him from the guard who has
bloodied him because of a slight homsexual gesture toward a
boy in the library. Roquentin acts very late to disengage the
Autodidacte and lead him away from the guard and some outraged readers. «Had these lazy years in Bouville rotted me?»
(N. p. 168). One must recall that one of Roquentin's ontological
crises becomes the most distressing one, the only one expressed
in a stream of consciousness (N, pp. 100-102), when he gets news
of the death of a child, Lucienne, whom he probably had met some
days earlier. His intervention, which could have saved her from
rape and death («her fingers clawing at the mud») was only
indecisive (N, pp. 75, 77, 79-80). His failure to become deliberately involved weighs on him: «I am a rotten person» (N, p. 145).
The tentative character of what may be called the epilogue to
La Nazis& (pp. 169-78) lies in Sartre's difficulty in fully grounding
his concept of commitment in ontology.(18) It is an Engfuhrung,
Published by New Prairie Press
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a playing together of contradictory themes--contingency and
facticity--but without a resolution.
The rag-time melody is an antidote to nausea because it
transports Roquentin, at least in imagination, to a realm of necessity and of coherence. Could he not, like the composer and singer
of the melody, justify a little his existence by creating a work of
art?(19) It would have to be a book, by which people would
understand their existence, and it would be a book to unmask the
bastards. «It would have ... to make people ashamed of their
existence.» It is true that «an existant can never justify the
existence of another existant» (N, p. 178), but this appeal to
people's authenticity, unlike the response to contingency in bad
faith, might do for his readers what the melody had done for
Roquentin. At the end of the crisis of his original project, after
«everything went blank,» we find Roquentin «alone and free»
(N, p. 157), on the brink of commitment in literature, a radically
new choice of himself intimated all along in his attitude towards
people: negative but far from indifferent.
It seems that only in 1940 did Sartre become conscious of
commitment as a concept (Ecrits, p. 28). He has wrestled with
it all through his work.(20) But it would appear that a normative
ethics is a contradiction in terms for existentialism. The

projected second volume of Being and Nothingness, an ethics,
as well as the concluding volume of The Roads to Freedom, which
was to show the conditions of commmitment, have never been
written. And, having questioned the validity of humanism, what
would be the criteria for the direction of involvement? Sartre
proposed a Pascalian wager which continually invents its
imperatives and remains without promise: «We had to do our
work as men in face of the incomprehensible and the insupportable, to wager, to conjecture without proof, to undertake despite
uncertainty and to persevere without hope.0(21) Sartre's own
direction of commitment can be understood as an endeavor to
minimize the utilitarian relationships prevailing in society.
Roquentin leaves Bouville for Paris. Even Beckett, after
Endgame, keeps writing. It would seem that sheer facticity and
the diasporic character of consciousness are a necessary cause,
if not a sufficient one, for commitment.
La Nausee, «the century's most influential novel in
France, »(22) has many aspects other than those touched upon in
the present article. It presents nothing less than a Weltan-
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schauung, a world view.(23) And in it «the correspondences
between the literary expression and the detailed philosophical
theory are far more elaborate than one might at first suppose. »(24)
But La Nazis& remains the account of an experience not relative
to a thought process, its premises, its logical discourse and
verification. «Those who exist let themselves be encountered,
but you can never deduce anything from them» (N, p. 131).
Nor do contingency and facticity, the spirit of seriousness and
commitment derive from language as a structure imposing a view
of the world on the speaker, as now claimed so widely.(25) Very
much to the contrary: pre-linguistic fascination and horror have
sought expression in La Nausee and Roquentin mistrusts language
in his moments of illumination.(26)
It is a novel where affective consciousness breaks the ground
for new concepts, a book genuinely literary in its intuition of
philosophy. In the lived world of Nausea a radical conversion
takes place away from age-old essentialism and determinism to
existence and authenticity.

NOTES

This article was to be a chapter in a Festschrift to honor the late Jean-Albert
Bede. But it has not appeared.
1.
See «Sartre, Jean-Paul,. Columbia Dictionary of Modern European Literature
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1947), pp. 722-23.
2. «Existentialismus: Bemerkungen zu Jean-Paul Sartres L'Etre et le Neant,.
Kultur and Gesellschaft 2 (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1965), p. 84.
3. Sartre himself had at first chosen «Melancholia.. Interestingly, Gaston
Gallimard, the «other,» with a keener understanding than the author of the crux
of the book, persuaded him to change to the less spiritual title. See Michel
Contat and Michel Rybalka, Les Ecrits de Sartre (Paris: Gallimard, 1970), p. 63
(henceforth: Ecrits).
4. Sartre's «lived world» is a further development of Husserl's «Lebenswelt,
which represented the pre-scientific experience of the world made possible by a
bracketing out of scientific knowledge of one's perception. For Sartre, not
perception alone, but the entire pre-reflexive experience of the world is involved:
The lived world presents itself as irrepressible spontaneity» (L 'Idiot de la famine
[Paris: Gallimard, 19711, I, 142).
5. L'Etre et le Neant. (Paris: Gallimard. 1943), p. 220 (Henceforth: EN).
6. «This term «nausea» should be taken as anything but a metaphor drawn
from our physiological disgust; on the contrary, it serves as the basis (as a
«coenesthesic affectivity ... a pure apprehension of oneself as factual existence»)

*
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from which emerge all concrete and empirical nauseas» (EN, p. 404).
7. See Ecrits, especially pp. 23-26.
8. Already Nietzsche was put out by «Philisterernst.» The philisitine is so
concerned with income, business and habits that trivial, everyday life becomes
«divine.» («Unzeitgemissige Betrachtungen,» Werke, 1. Band, Munchen:
Carl Hauser, 1960 (1873), p. 146). And the term «Spiessbiirger» had been applied
by German students to townspeople with middleclass attitudes since the seven-

teenth century.
9. See also EN, Chapter II, «Bad Faith,» and p. 721.
10. Nausea, translated by Lloyd Alexander (New York: New Directions, 1964
11939]), p. 2 (henceforth: N).
11. See EN, pp. 690-94, for Sartre's understanding of its relation to his ontology.
12. In spite of such a dramatization of the dichotomy for-itself/in-itself, Alain
Robbe-Grillet accuses Sartre as well as Camus of a «fatal complicity,» a solidarity
with nature in taking a tragic view of the distance separating man from it (see p.
70 of his «Nature, humanisme, tragedie,» in Pour un nouveau roman, Idees (Paris:
Gallimard, 1963 (1958), pp. 55-84). He does, however correctly make a distinction
between the vision of the two authors have of nature--between Sartre's primarily
phenomenological concern for touch and color, and Camus's anthropomorphic
metaphors and similes more in line with the traditional humanist oneness with
nature. One ought to add that this difference in descriptive approach is one of
seeing either a prior significance or none whatsoever in an all-pervading thingness,
of spiritualizing it or of simply reflecting it as does Sartre. Robbe-Grillet's own
deliberate distance from objects goes further yet in its willed impassibility.
13. 'I his is the question Heidegger also raised with such insistence as «die
urspriinglichste Frage.--the most fundamental question: «Warum ist fiberhaupt
Seiendes and nicht vielmehr nichts?--Altogether, why is there being, and not
rather nothingness? Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik (Tubingen: Max Niemeyer,
1958 [1935]), pp. 1-7.
14. An extension, as it were, of the concept of the in-itself into the social sphere.
which Sartre makes in the Critique de la raison dialectique (see especially Livre I
on the «pratico-inert ensemble» which is society [Paris: Gallimard, 1960]).
In Nausea we do not know where experience is leading us and experience
15.
does not know where it is going» (Maurice Blanchot, «Les Romans de Sartre,
La Part du feu [Paris: Gallimard, 1949]), p. 200).
16. All the sarcasm heaped on the Bouville elite does not placate Genevieve Idt:
The two series of oppositions (leaders vs. soldiers, bastards vs. authentic persons)
on wich Nausea rests have nothing to do with the class struggle» (La Nausee,
Analyse critique [Paris: Hatier, 1971], p. 13). Professor Idt who approached the
novel aprioristically from a pseudo-marxist, structuralist point of view, seems
unaware that Sartre treats primarily the ontological, the human problem (facticity
and contingency), which, while interacting with the social (the spirit of seriousness)
remains fundamental. «Aristocrats, elite, and professional groups had melted
into the warm crowd. Only scattered men were left who were not representative»
D

(N, p. 51).
17.
Knowledge for

Sartre must be related to the life people lead, since praxis- their action in the social arena--is disclosure of knowledge. Sartre has explained
that all his life he tried to provide a philosophical foundation for realism (which
https://newprairiepress.org/sttcl/vol3/iss1/8
relates pure reflection to praxis), ... to give man both his autonomy and his reality
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among real objects, avoiding idealism without lapsing into mechanistic materialism
(«Itinerary of a Thought,» Interview, New Left Review, No. 58 (NovemberDecember 1969), pp. 18and 45).
18. «All the child's traits remain present in the fifty-year old. ... Griselidis not
dead. Pardillan still lives in me. And Strogoff. (Characters in children's books,
with miraculous powers to save others.) I depend on them, they depend only on
God, and I do not believe in God. Try to understand that» (Les Mots, p. 212).
19. Sartre's attitude is not one of art for art's sake--art must lead to lucidity.
Merleau-Ponty had already pointed out that when Sartre had chosen the rag-time
melody he «thus did away from the start with the religion of art and its consolations» (Sens et Non -Sens. [Paris: Nagel, 1965], p. 80). See also Simone de
Beauvoir. La Force de l'age (Paris: Gallimard, 1960) p. 145, for the
commotment-leitmotif aspect of this melody.
20. See «commitment» in my Jean-Paul Sartre: The Philosopher as a Literary
Critic (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), especially pp. 258-64.
21. Quest-ce que la litterature?, Situations, II (Paris: Gallimard, 1948) p. 254.
22. Henri Peyre, Jean-Paul Sartre (New York: Columbia University Press,
1968), p. 25.
23. Madeleine Morris can thus justifiably treat of «Faust a Bouville» (Revue de
Litterature Comparee, October-December 1968, pp. 534-48).
24. Rhiannon Goldthorpe, The Representation of Consciousness in Sartre's
La Nausee and its Theoretical Basis: Reflection and Facticiy,» French Studies,
(April 1968), p. 116. In this article (pp. 114-33) and its sequel «Transcendence
and Intentionality» (French Studies, January 1971, pp. 32-46), these correspondences are thoroughly established.
25. Sartre rejects this structuralist contention-4(mm is the being through whom
meanings appear in the world» (Situations) Paris: Gallimard, 1947 (1943),
p. 186). And he stated expressly: «I reject also structuralism. ... There is
nothing before man ... except man making himself.» «L'Ecrivain et sa langue»
in Situations. IX (Paris: Gallimard, 1972 119651), p. 52.
26. «The word absurdity is coming to life under my pen; a little while ago, in the
garden, I couldn't find it, but neither was I looking for it, I didn't need it ... And
without formulating anything clearly, I understood ... Absurdity: another word;
I struggle against words; down there I touched the thing ... Oh, how can I put it
in words?» (N p. 129). In later works Sartre will not continue to use the term
absurdity since it is related to rationalism.
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